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Oella Ridge Tr. v. Silver State Schs. Credit Union, A Nev. Corp.,
137 Nev. Adv. Op. 80 (Dec. 23, 2021)1
Motion to Dismiss –– Declaratory Relief Action Challenging Attorney Fees
Summary:
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether attorney fees imposed under a deed of
trust must comport with the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure’s (NRCP) timely filing
requirements.2 Here, the Court found that because the obligation to pay reasonable attorney fees
arose from a deed of trust rather than a judgment or court order the NRCP rules were inapplicable
and normal rules of contract interpretation governed. Because the obligation was clearly and
expressly stated and because the contract applied to Appellant, payment of the fees was properly
requested.
Facts & Procedural History:
Appellant, Oella Ridge Trust (Oella Ridge), purchased a property at an HOA’s foreclosure
sale and thereafter moved to quiet title. Respondent, Silver State Schools Credit Union (Silver
State) opposed the attempt to quiet title by proffering their first position deed of trust to the
property. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the HOA foreclosure sale did not
extinguish Silver State’s deed of trust or priority status.3 On remand, the district court entered
judgment in Silver State’s favor, finding that Oella Ridge owns the property subject to Silver
State’s first position deed of trust.
Oella Ridge subsequently requested Silver State’s note payoff amount. Silver State
responded with a payoff amount that included the principal balance of approximately $138,000 as
well as $96,000 of attorney fees Silver State had accumulated during the previous action. Oella
Ridge filed a complaint for declaratory relief arguing the attorney fees were unreasonable and that
Silver State had waived the right to attorney fees by failing to timely seek fees during the previous
litigation. The district court granted summary judgment to Silver State citing the deed of trust’s
terms and finding the requested attorney fees reasonable. The district court then dismissed Oella
Ridges complaint with prejudice.
Oella Ridge appealed, arguing Silver State waived its right to seek attorney fees by failing
to timely file a motion for those fees following the quiet title action as required by NRCP 54(d)(2).4
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NRCP 54(d)(2).
3
See Silver State Sch. Cred. Union v. Oella Ridge Tr., No. 76382, 2019 WL 3061742 (Nev. July 11, 2019) (Order
of Reversal and Remand).
4
Oella Ridge also raised arguments under NRS 18.010 and NRS 18.110 but because the arguments were not raised
previously, the court declined to consider them here.
2

Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court treated the district court’s dismissal as summary judgment.5
Therefore, they reviewed the decision de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact existed and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 6 Because
there were no factual disputes, and contract interpretation is a question of law, the Court proceeded
to interpret the deed of trust’s provisions according to its clear and plain language.7
The Court explained that Section 9 of the deed of trust stated that Silver State had the right
to “do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate” to protect their interest in the property,
including “paying reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The contract further stated, “any amount disbursed
by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security
Instrument.”
The Court concluded that Section 9 clearly applied to Oella Ridge because when Oella
Ridge purchased the property it took title subject to the deed of trust and pursuant to the promissory
note, neither of which were extinguished by the HOA foreclosure sale. The Court pointed to similar
court decisions that also concluded a lender may use a deed of trust to secure attorney costs
incurred in protection the lender’s interests, even where, as here, a nonborrower sought to pay off
the loan.8 The Court highlighted that Oella Ridge did not contest being bound by Section 9 nor did
Oella Ridge offer an alternative contractual interpretation.
Oella Ridge’s lone argument was that Silver State had waived its right to attorney fees
under NRCP 54(d)(2). The Court found this argument unpersuasive because Oella Ridge’s
obligation to pay did not arise from a judgment or from an order on a motion where NRCP 54(d)(2)
applied. Instead, the obligation directly arose from the deed of trust’s Section 9. Further, briefings
and other documents demonstrated the requested attorney fees were reasonable. Therefore, the
Court held NRCP 54(d)(2) to be inapplicable.
Conclusion
Because NRCP 54(d)(2) was inapplicable, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
that Silver State properly added the attorney fees to the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
The Court then dismissed Oella Ridge’s request for declaratory relief.
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